... og vi leser kollapslitteraur

Reinventing Collapse - The Soviet Example and American Prospects (Dmitry Orlov)

og

Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change (William R. Catton, jr.)

Reinventing Collapse er en klassiker. Orlov er morsom uten å bli flåsete, innsiktsfull uten å være belærende. Han vokste opp i SovjetUnionen (SU), men har bodd og arbeidet mesteparten av sitt voksne liv i USA (US), så han kjenner begge verdener godt. Blandt veldig mange interessante poenger han har å komme med er den grunnleggende observasjonen at SU og US er veldig like. Selvsagt også veldig forskjellige, men mange av forskjellen er bare propaganda - og SUs demonisering av US var svært lik US' demonisering av SU. Begge var teknologisk-industrielle imperier; forskjellen lå først og fremst i organisasjonsmodellen. Og Orlov er overbevist om at det er en relativt uviktig forskjell; SUs fall bør ikke sees på som et bevis for at US' organisasjonsmodell "seiret" og SUs "tapte", men som en advarsel: Hovmod står for fall. US' fall tar han for gitt:

I therefore take as my premise that at some point during the coming years, due to an array of factors, with energy scarcity foremost among them, the economic system of the United States will teeter and fall, to be replaced by something that most people can scarcely guess at, and that even those who see it coming prefer not to think about. This stunning failure of the collective imagination is the specific problem this book seeks to address. (s 15)

(Annetsteds sier han at årsaken til SUs fall var at sovjetisk oljeproduksjon gikk utforbakke - bratt.)

Orlov er en skikkelig russisk bjørn på Amerika:

Most alternative forms of energy - solar, wind, water, nuclear, garbage incineration, gerbil wheels or hot air piped in directly Washington - will have only a small overall impact. The United States will not have enough energy to keep its economy functioning. There is also not enough energy, nor enough time, to build a different, more energy-efficient economy, on the same scale as the present one. The best alternative by far is to reduce energy consumption by progressively shutting down all non-vital parts of the economy, while commandeering and redistributing resources to uniformly provide for the welfare of the entire population. Since such a revolution is not politically possible, the only remaining alternative is economic and political collapse.

My conclusion is that the Soviet Union was much better prepared for economic collapse than is the United States. America's economy will evaporate like the morning mist.

[...]

Economic collapse has a way of turning economic negatives into positives. The last thing we want is a perfectly functioning, growing, prosperous economy that suddenly collapses one day and leaves everybody in the lurch. Luckily, there is little prospect of such a scenario. (s 104 f)

Observasjonene om "Drugs and Alcohol" er også et sitat verd:

To a Russian, being drunk is almost a sacred right; to an American, it is a guilty pleasure. [...] The Russian can get furiously drunk in public, stagger about singing patriotic songs, fall into a snow bank, and either freeze to death or be carted off to a drunk tank. All this produces little or no remorse in him. Based on my reading of H. L. Mencken, America was also once upon a time a land of happy drunks, where a whiskey bottle would be passed around the courtroom at the start of the proceedings and a drunken jury would later render a drunken verdict. [...] When the economy collapses, hard-drinking people everywhere find all the more reason to get drunk, but much less werewithal with which to procure drink. In Russia, innovative market-based solutions were quickly improvised, which it was my privilege to observe. [...] In all, we should expect drugs and alcohol to become one of the largest short-term post-collapse entrepreneurial opportunities in the United States, along with asset stripping and security. (p 147)

----

Collapse er også en klassiker; utkom første gang i 1980, og kalt den beste boken om emnet av minst en kommentator på TODs "linkfest". Bokens uttalte mål er å frambringe et paradigmeskifte - det gamle paradigmet er vekstparadigmet fra "The Age of Exuberance" (roughly, pionertiden i USA); det nye, det økologiske paradigmet. Vi ser ikke verden bare gjennom øynene, sier Catton, men også gjennom våre idéer... paradigmet. Den første delen av boken snakker om vekstparadigmet, dets historie og svakheter... den andre om det nye, økologiske paradigmet. Det gis masse referanser, og tonen i boken er definitivt intellektuell. Det er mye interessant her, men bokens skop er bredt, så det er begrenset hvor dypt inn i materien den trenger... Dypest og mest interessant er beskrivelsen av The Age of Exuberance; Catton er i utgangspunktet sosiolog, og det merkes. Til å være en bok som forfekter et økologisk paradigme, snakker den veldig lite om økologi, annet enn å hamre inn på annenhver side at mennesket er et dyr som alle andre og er underlagt de samme naturlover... et standpunkt jeg deler, men det blir litt for mye misjonering og litt for lite argumentering og opplysning for meg.

Jeg kommer forhåpentligvis tilbake til Collapse her i et essay med mine reaksjoner på boken... men foreløpig, en av de mer interessante passasjene, en diskusjon av Malthus:

Malthus did indeed err, but not in the way that has been commonly supposed. He rightly discerned "the power of population" to increase exponentially "if unchecked". He rightly noted that population growth ordinarily is not unchecked. He saw that it was worth inquiring into the means by which the exponential growth tendency is normally checked. He was perceptive in attaching the label "misery" to some of the ramification of these means. Where he was wrong was in supposing that the means worked fully and immediately. (That this was his error has not been seen by those who reject his views.)

[..]

Despite Malthus's belief to the contrary, it is possible to exceed an environment's carrying capacity -- temporarily. Many species have done it. A species with as long an interval between generations as is characteristic of ours, and with cultural as well as biological aspects, can be expected to do it.

[...]

By not quite seeing that carrying capacity can be temporarily overshot, Malthus understated life's perils. He thus enabled both the admirers and the detractors of his admonitory writings to neglect the effects of overshoot -- environmental degradation and carrying capacity reduction.

Moyers-interview med Asimov

http://www.wesjones.com/asimov.htm

MOYERS: What about the subject you've written so much about - the population explosion? Right now, the population of the globe is over five billion. You've warned us about what will happen if it continues at its two percent growth rate per year.

ASIMOV: Actually, the growth rate is down to one-point-six percent, but with the higher population, it's the same amount in actual numbers: eighty million a year. By the year 2000, it's going to be perhaps six-point-five billion.

MOYERS: That's just twelve years from now. How many people do you think the earth is able to sustain?

ASIMOV: I don't think it's able to sustain the five billion in the long run. Right now most of the world is living under appalling conditions. We can't possibly improve the conditions of everyone. We can't raise the entire world to the average standard of living in the United States because we don't have the resources and the ability to distribute well enough for that. So right now as it is, we have condemned most of the world to a miserable, starvation level of existence. And it will just get worse as the population continues to go up.

MOYERS: But you can't just say to a woman, "Don't have children."

ASIMOV: That's not the problem; it's that so many people are saying, "Have children." There is such a pro-natalist attitude in the world. We celebrate Mother's Day so enthusiastically, we say, "May all your troubles be little ones," we celebrate additional children. I feel sometimes that if we'd only stop pushing for children, somehow there would be fewer of them.

MOYERS: Why did you say that the price of survival is the equality of women?

ASIMOV: Because if women are allowed to enter into all facets of the human condition, if they can enter business, if they can enter religion, science, government on an equal basis with men, they will be so busy they won't feel it necessary to have a great many children. As long as you have women under conditions where they don't feel any sense of value or self-worth except as mothers, they'll have a lot of children because that's the only way they can prove they're worth something. In general, if you look through the world, the lower the status of women, the higher the birth rate, and the higher the birth rate, the lower the status of women. If you could raise the status of women, I am certain the birth rate would fall drastically through the choice of the women themselves. We're always saying that there's no fulfillment like having
children, but I notice mostly it's men who say that. You know, men get along without giving birth to children. They do that by finding other things to do. If women could find other things to do, too, they would have fewer children.

MOYERS: But once again, you are in conflict with a biblical imperative, "Be fruitful and multiply."

ASIMOV: Right. But God said that when Adam and Eve were the only two people in the world. He said, "Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth." The earth was replenished long ago. That's one of the problems of fundamentalism. Fundamentalists take a statement that made sense at the time it was made, and because they refuse to consider that the statement may not be an absolute, eternal truth, they continue following it under conditions where to do so is deadly.

MOYERS: What happens to the idea of the dignity of the human species if this population growth continues at its present rate?

ASIMOV: It will be completely destroyed. I like to use what I call my bathroom metaphor: If two people live in an apartment, and there are two bathrooms, then both have freedom of the bathroom. You can go to the bathroom anytime you want to and stay as long as you want to for whatever you need. And everyone believes in the freedom of the bathroom; it should be right there in the Constitution.

But if you have twenty people in the apartment and two bathrooms, no matter how much every person believes in freedom of the bathroom, there is no such thing. You have to set up times for each person, you have to bang at the door: "Aren't you through yet?" and so on. In the same way, democracy cannot survive overpopulation. Human dignity cannot survive it. Convenience and decency cannot survive it. As you put more and more people onto the world, the value of life not only declines, it disappears. It doesn't matter if someone dies. The more people there are, the less one individual matters.

MOYERS: People say the United States is bringing its population under control, that many Americans are not even reproducing themselves, and that what the rest of the world does, we can't control.

ASIMOV: The population of the United States is still going up. The only time it went up really slowly was during the Great Depression, when there were no laws lowering the birth rate, there was just an economic depression, which made people think twice before they had children. But the United States is doing something else - it is absolutely refusing to help nations control population. Our feeling is that it's enough for us to make sure that the United States is in good shape, and what other nations do is their business. It's not just their business - it's our business, too.

MOYERS: Can we exist as a stable economy and a stable society if around us are turmoil and chaos?

ASIMOV: Absolutely not. Right now many nations are destroying the rain forests because they need the firewood, and they need the space for farms.

MOYERS: Why should we care about that?

ASIMOV: Because without the rain forests, we're going to have deserts. The food supply will dwindle. As a matter of fact, there's even the possibility that we're going to lose all kinds of valuable substances we know nothing about. Those rain forests have an incredible number of species of plants and animals that we know very little about. Some of them may produce chemicals of great pharmacological and medical importance. If properly cultivated, some of the plants might be new food sources. In addition to that, nothing produces the oxygen of the atmosphere with the same intensity that a forest does. Anything that substitutes for it will be producing less oxygen. We're going to be destroying our atmosphere, too.

MOYERS: What did you mean when you said once that we have to stop living by the code of the past?

ASIMOV: Times change. For example, in the past we felt motherhood was the most important thing a woman could do, and that to be a good wife and mother was the sum total of a woman's purpose in life. She didn't need an education or interests outside the house. You know, Kinder, Kirche, Kuche - the children, the church, the kitchen - or in English you say, "Keep 'em barefoot and pregnant." Well, we can't do that any more. We can't raise women to be baby machines. In the old days, we didn't worry about the future. Now we must. Things are changing so fast that we have to worry about the future all the time.

"We can't raise women to be baby machines"... Nei, ikke dersom vi skal skape et bærekraftig samfunn.

Men dette er et av de virkelig, virkelig store utfordringene: Å sette opp de sosiale spillereglene - på verdensbasis - slik at det ikke lønner seg for noen, det være seg familier, stammer, religioner, eller nasjoner, å gjøre sine kvinner til babymaskiner.

Problemet er at det er en veldig sterk seleksjonseffekt involvert: Kulturer som gjør sine kvinner til babymaskiner vil gjennomgå eksponensiell vekst (til de når sin Malthusianske grense); kulturer som ikke gjør det, stagnerer.

Selv om ordet "stagnasjon" er negativt ladet i daglig språkbruk, så er det nettopp stagnasjon vi ønsker å oppnå i vår situasjon... vi ønsker oss et paradigmeskifte her.

Problemet er at dersom du har to kulturer, den ene med en flat befolkningsutvikling og den andre med eksponensiell vekst, så tar det ikke lang tid før den første er vekk.

Eksponensiell vekst trumfer alt!

(jeg har snakket om dette tidligere)

PO vs GO (EB)

Is business-as-usual likely in a peak oil scenario? (Dave Cohen/Energy Bulletin)

Interessant titt på samspillet mellom Peak Oil/FF, klimaforandringer, økonomi og politikk. Konklusjon:

Assuming that peak oil occurs early in the next decade, and the currently envisioned cap & trade system, which goes into effect in 2012, is actually implemented, we can expect an overall decline in carbon emissions in the United States during the period 2010-2020. If growing emissions are a necessary condition for economic growth, as I have argued here and in The Radical Hypothesis, it follows that the American economy will shrink, not grow, in the coming decade.

If world oil production peaks, I predict most people will forget about terrifying business-as-usual climate scenarios. Instead, they will get down to the hard business of replacing oil by any means possible. If the economy is shrinking, any means necessary will be used to jump start growth. I am not so much interested in what should happen. I am interested in what will happen.

Thus, the years 2010-2020 will likely be the decisive decade of the 21st century. We should know by 2020 whether economies can grow as emissions decline. The result will define our response to anthropogenic climate change in all the decades to follow. We will know whether the consensus view espoused by Joe Romm, John Holdren and many others, as I have believed all along, is merely a politically expedient, faith-based “green jobs” guess about how things will turn out. Should that guess be proved wrong, our political leaders will run the other way.

Hvor går Norge?

OK, noen korte tanker om hva framtia kan bringe.

Det virker ganske opplagt at USA er fucked, og at det vil komme et nytt og værre krakk enn det vi så i fjor høst. Min gjetning er at det skjer i oktober '09; oktober er krakkmåneden...

Men hva skjer i Norge? DET avhenger stort sett av oljeprisen, og det er slett ikke sikkert at oljeprisen går i kjelleren (som livlig diskutert på TOD siste uker). Og på litt lenger sikt enn noen måneder, så virker det rimelig opplagt at de eneste landene i verden som kommer til å gjøre det "bra" er... oljeeksportører.

Mine herskaper, dette kan bli helt fryktelig. Allerede ser det ut til at euforien er tilbake i boligmarkedet... dersom resten av verden med USA i spissen går inn i en 10-år-pluss Greater Depression, men vi unngår en total kollaps... så kommer Norge til å holde seg på beina... det betyr alle (bolig, aksje, whatever-)boblers oldemor! For alt det som måtte være igjen av "hot money" kommer til å rømme til Den Siste Boblen...

Ta så med i beregningen at vi neppe har stort mer enn ti år igjen som oljeeksportør i verdensklasse... OK vi har kanskje gass lenger enn det, men you get my point... Vi risikerer å bli Bobleland, et nordens Dubai, med en enda mer vannvittig gjeldsgrad enn vi har i dag... og når boblen sprekker... om en ti, kanskje femten års tid... en episk sprekk. Vi kommer til å bli så bankerott at Island fremstår som et paradis.

En kommentator - husker ikke hvem - mente her i vinter at de heldigste landene er de som går konk tidlig i denne prosessen, for de har fremdeles et internasjonalt samfunn som kan hjelpe dem sånn ca. på fote igjen. Å konke når alle andre har mer enn nok med seg selv...

En guide til The Automatic Earth

The Automatic Earth har etterhvert blitt den økonomibloggen jeg leser med størst oppmerksomhet. De presenterer seg selv slik: Stoneleigh and Ilargi present a daily overview of Debt, Diesel and Dämmerung.. De har mye til felles med - og kommenterer og korrigerer - blogghelter som Mish, Denninger og Ritholz, men har noe ingen andre bloggere jeg har lest har: i tillegg til tung peiling på økonomi, er de også eksperter på energi - Stoneleigh var tidligere en nøkkelfigur på TOD - og kunnskapsrike og innsiksfulle innen politikk, økologi, ... Stoneleigh skriver i sin kritikk av Gary North:

In order to understand the scope of our predicament, it is necessary to understand finance, but also energy (net energy, EROEI, receding horizons etc), ecological carrying capacity and population, collective psychology and herding behaviour (see Prechter), diminishing marginal returns to socio-economic complexity (see Tainter), catabolic collapse (see Greer), positive feedback loops, adaptive ecological cycles (see Holling), pollution and pathogens, game theory, real politik, risk dynamics, reality versus perception as socioeconomic drivers etc, etc. Breadth and depth are not mutually exclusive, and the narrowly focused approach will only take one so far.

Kanskje det viktigste punktet TAE stadig terper på er at dette (for USAs del) ikke bare eller først og fremst er en økonomisk krise, men en politisk krise. Banker går overende i et rasende tempo; men noen få gjør det kjempebra... Men de som gjør det kjempebra nå, er ikke de som fulgte ansvarlig forrettningsskikk i årene før 2008 - de går konk -, det er de som har politiske forbindelser. Dette systemet er så korrupt, så moralsk fallitt, at... vel...

Uansett, TAEs post for dagen, Prime Rhyming Times, er en guide til stedet - hvilke nøkkelposter en nykommer bør lese og i hvilken rekkefølge.

Så sett i gang og les,

Vannproblemer for næringslivet

Diminishing water supplies creating profound business risk

“With global temperatures on the rise, scientists expect water shortages, like those now in California and China, to spread across the globe and become even more severe. The consequences for our already reeling global economy will be profound. A diversity of businesses — from electronics manufacturers and power producers to apparel and food companies — can expect water bills to rise, allotments to decrease, and water quality regulations to tighten.

“Water is one of our most critical raw materials — even more important than oil, for there are no alternatives. Peter Brabeck-Letmathe, chairman of Nestlé, put it starkly in The Economist: ‘I am convinced that, under present conditions and with the way water is being managed, we will run out of water long before we run out of fuel.’

“Already, China, India, and the western United States are seeing growth limited by reduced water supplies from shrinking glaciers and melting snowcaps that sustain key rivers. Meanwhile, power plants in Australia, Europe, and the southeast United States have been forced to cut back on power generation because more frequent and intense heat waves and droughts are impacting water supplies.

Ugo Bardi tolker Tainter

i "Peak Civilization": The Fall of the Roman Empire.

Litt overdramatisering av slakten i Teutoburgerskogen, synes jeg, men ellers veldig, veldig bra. Og langt. Et utdrag:

You'll probably agree that this explanation by Gibbon is a bit limited; just as are limited other interpretations by authors who came later. Spengler and Tonybee are two examples, but if we were to discuss their work in detail it would take - well - weeks; not hours. So, let me jump forward to the historian who - I think - has given a new and original interpretation of the decline of Rome: Joseph Tainter with his "The Collapse of Complex Societies". His book was published for the first time in 1990. [Jeg leste den som Påskekrim.]

It is a great book. I suggest to you to read it and ponder it. It is truly a mine of information about collapses. It doesn't deal just with the Roman Empire, but with many other civilizations. Tainter goes well beyond the simplistic interpretation of many earlier authors and identifies a key point in the question of collapse. Societies are complex entities; he understands that. And, hence, their collapse must be related to complexity. Here is an excerpt of Tainter's way of thinking. It is a transcription of a interview that Tainter gave in the film "Blind Spot" (2008)

In ancient societies that I studied, for example the Roman Empire, the great problem that they faced was when they would have to incur very high costs just to maintain the status quo. Invest very high amounts in solving problems that don't yield a net positive return, but instead simply allowed them to maintain what they already got. This decreases the net benefit of being a complex society.

Here is how Tainter describes his view in graphical form; in his book.



So, you see that Tainter has one thing very clear: complexity gives a benefit, but it is also a cost. This cost is related to energy, as he makes clear in his book. And in emphasizing complexity, Tainter gives us a good definition of what we intend for collapse. Very often people have been discussing the collapse of ancient societies without specifying what they meant for "collapse". For a while, there has been a school of thought that maintained that the Roman Empire had never really "collapsed". It had simply transformed itself into something else. But if you take collapse defined as "a rapid reduction of complexity" then you have a good definition and that's surely what happened to the Roman Empire.

So, what was important with the collapse of the Roman Empire is not whether or not there was an emperor in Rome (or, as it was the case later, in Ravenna). We might well imagine that the line of the emperors could have continued well after Romulus Augustulus - the last emperor. And even after him there remained a legitimate Roman Emperor in Byzantium, in the Eastern Empire. You could very well say that the Empire didn't disappear as long as there were emperors in Byzantium, that is, until Costantinople fell, in the 15th cenntury. And since the Russian Czars saw themselves as Roman emperors (that is where "Czar" comes from, from "Caesar"), you could say that the Roman Empire didn't disappear until the last Czar was deposed, in 1917. But that is not the point. The point is that the Roman Empire had started undergoing a catastrophic loss of complexity already during the third century. So, that was the real collapse. What happened later on is another story.

After that Tainter has spoken of complexity, and of the energy cost of complexity, it is perhaps surprising for us that he doesn't consider resource depletion as a cause of collapse. Resource depletion, after all, is the main theme of Jared Diamond's book "Collapse". It is how he interprets the collapse of many societies. Tainter explicitly denies that in his book. He says that if such a thing as depletion appears, then society should react against it. After all, it is normal: society always reacts to all kinds of crisis, and why shouldn't it react to resource depletion? This point made by Tainter may appear surprising - actually unpalatable - to people who have made resource depletion the centerpiece of their thought. Peak oilers, for instance.

The disagreement between peak oilers (and Diamond) and Tainter may not be so strong as it appears. That we'll see as we go deeper into the details. But before we do that, let me say something general about these explanations that people give for collapse. It happens all the time that people discover something that they describe as if it was the only cause for collapse. That is, they sort of get enamored of a single cause for collapse. They say, "I have the solution; it is this and nothing else."

Consider the story that Roman Empire collapse because the Romans used to drink wine in lead goblets; and so they died of lead poisoning. That has some truth: there is evidence of lead poisoning in ancient Roman skeletons; there are descriptions of lead poisoning in ancient Roman texts. Surely it was a problem, probably even a serious one. But you can't see this story of lead poisoning in isolation; otherwise you neglect everything else: the Roman Empire was not just people drinking wine in lead goblets. Think of a historian of the future who describes the fall of the American Empire as the result of Americans eating hamburgers. That would have some truth and for sure the kind of food that most Americans eat today is - well - we know that it is doing a lot of damage to the Americans in general. But you wouldn't say that hamburgers can be the cause of the fall of the American Empire. There is much more to that.

The same kind of reasoning holds for other "causes" that have been singled out for the fall of Rome. Think, for instance, of climatic change. Also here, there is evidence that the fall of the Roman Empire was accompanied by droughts. That may surely have been a problem for the Romans. But, again, we might fall in the same mistake of a future historian who might attribute the fall of the American Empire - say - to the hurricane Katrina.(I have nothing special against the American Empire, it is just that it is the current empire)

The point that Tainter makes, quite correctly, in his book is that it is hard to see the fall of such a complex thing as an empire as due to a single cause. A complex entity should fall in a complex manner, and I think it is correct. In Tainter's view, societies always face crisis and challenges of various kinds. The answer to these crisis and challenges is to build up structures - say, bureaucratic or military - in response. Each time a crisis is faced and solved, society finds itself with an extra layer of complexity. Now, Tainter says, as complexity increases, the benefit of this extra complexity starts going down - he calls it "the marginal benefit of complexity". That is because complexity has a cost - it costs energy to maintain complex systems. As you keep increasing complexity, this benefit become negative. The cost of complexity overtakes its benefit. At some moment, the burden of these complex structures is so great that the whole society crashes down - it is collapse.

I think that Tainter has understood a fundamental point, here. Societies adapt to changes. Indeed, one characteristic of complex systems is of adapting to changing external conditions. It is called "homeostasis" and I tend to see it as the defining characteristic of a complex system (as opposed to simply complicated). So, in general, when you deal with complex systems, you should not think in terms of "cause and effect" but, rather, in terms of "forcing and feedback". A forcing is something that comes from outside the system. A feedback is how the system reacts to a forcing, usually attaining some kind of homeostasis. Homeostasis, is a fundamental concept in system dynamics. Something acts on something else, but also that something else reacts. It is feedback. It may be positive (reinforcing) or negative (damping) and we speak of "feedback loops" which normally stabilize systems - within limits, of course.

Homeostasis has to be understood for what it is. It is not at all the same thing as "equilibrium" as it is defined in thermodynamics. For example, a human being is a complex system. When you are alive, you are in homeostasis. If you are in equilibrium, it means that you are dead. Homeostasis is a dynamical equilibrium of forces.

Also, homeostasis cannot contradict the principles of physics. It can only adapt to physical laws. Think of yourself swimming in the sea. Physics says that you should float, but you need to expend some energy to maintain a homeostatic condition in which your head stays above the water. Now, suppose that your feet get entangled with something heavy. Then, physics says that you should sink. Yet, you can expend more energy, swim harder, and still keep your head above the water - again it is homeostasis. But, if nothing changes, at some moment you'll run out of energy, you get tired and you can't keep homeostasis any more. At this point, physics takes over and you sink, and you drown. It is the typical behavior of complex systems. They can maintain homeostasis for a while, as long as they have resources to expend for this purpose.

Something similar occurs for human societies. When there is a forcing, say, an epidemics that kills a lot of people, societies react by generating more children. Look at the demographic statistics for our societies: there is a dip in numbers for the world wars, but it is rapidly compensated by more births afterward. Also in Roman times there were epidemics and the eruption of the Vesuvius that killed a lot of people. But those were small forcings that the Roman society could compensate.

Not all forcings can be compensated, but we know that the Romans were not destroyed by an asteroid that fell into the Mediterranean Sea. It might have happened, and in that case there would have been no feedback able to keep the empire together. We would have a single cause for the disappearance of the Roman Empire and everybody would agree on that. But that has not happened, of course. Perhaps, something like that has happened to the Cretan civilization; destroyed by a volcanic eruption - but that's another story.

So, in Tainter's view there is this feedback relationship between complexity and energy. At least the way I interpret it. Complexity feeds on energy and also strains the availability of energy. It is feedback. And not just energy; resources in general. So, I think that Tainter is right in refusing a simple explanation like "resource depletion is the cause of the fall of the Roman Empire". But, clearly, resources are an important part of his model. I think Tainter had in mind the Roman Empire when he developed this model, but it is of quite general validity. If this is the way things stand, his model is not in contrast with the models we have that see resource depletion as the main factor that causes collapse. But not the only cause. We must see collapse as something dynamic, and now I'll try to explain just that.

(Også noen veldig interessante kommentarer, spesielt en information dump fra arkeologen Boris ("mididoctors") om potteskår i Londinium: "they dumped them in the river"...)

Et viktig relatert poeng er at kapital må ansees som "kompleksitet" i Taintersk forstand (selv om det er diskutabelt om Tainter selv hadde det synet). Bardi var inne på dette tidligere i sommer, i The Fifth Problem: Peak Capital:

Here is a very clear description of how capital interacts with the other elements of the world model in a synopsis written in 1972 by the authors of the [Limits to Growth] report:

The industrial capital stock grows to a level that requires an enormous input of resources. In the very process of that growth it depletes a large fraction of the resource reserves available. As resource prices rise and mines are depleted, more and more capital must be used for obtaining resources, leaving less to be invested for future growth. Finally investment cannot keep up with depreciation, and the industrial base collapses, taking with it the service and agricultural systems, which have become dependent on industrial inputs.