Svineinfluensa

Det er med en viss motvilje jeg poster dette... jeg mener svineinfluensa-faren har vært sterkt overdrevet så langt... det har vært potensielt alvorlig, men det er ikke grunn til å gå fullstendig av skaftet; pluss at svineinfluensa-hysteri tar oppmerksomhet fra virkelig alvorlige problemer som vi i langt større grad kan gjøre noe med.

Men når jeg leser dette blir jeg også bekymret: WHO Warns Of Severe Form Of Swine Flu (NYTimes)

Earlier, WHO reported that H1N1 had reached epidemic levels in Japan, signalling an early start to what may be a long influenza season this year, and that it was also worsening in tropical regions.

"Perhaps most significantly, clinicians from around the world are reporting a very severe form of disease, also in young and otherwise healthy people, which is rarely seen during seasonal influenza infections," WHO said.

"In these patients, the virus directly infects the lung, causing severe respiratory failure. Saving these lives depends on highly specialized and demanding care in intensive care units, usually with long and costly stays."

Jeg kan ikke se at det er blitt rapportert i norske aviser, merkelig nok -- er det valgkampen som tar overhånd?

EDIT: Tja. Skulle lest den opprinnelige meldigen fra WHO (Preparing for the second wave: lessons from current outbreaks)først; den er langt fra like apokalyptisk. NYTs sitater er derfra, men de utelater jo (selvsagt) essensiell kontekst:

Close monitoring of viruses by a WHO network of laboratories shows that viruses from all outbreaks remain virtually identical. Studies have detected no signs that the virus has mutated to a more virulent or lethal form.

Likewise, the clinical picture of pandemic influenza is largely consistent across all countries. The overwhelming majority of patients continue to experience mild illness. Although the virus can cause very severe and fatal illness, also in young and healthy people, the number of such cases remains small.

Føler meg litt lurt, ja. Og det blir jo ikke bedre av at jeg burde ha lært den leksa for lenge siden... Og dette endte opp, ikke som en post om svineinfluensa, men om hvor forsiktig man må være når man leser MSM.

Jeg gremmes.

Fantastisk samling grafer (deflasjon)

her: The Week in Charts – Buckle the Heck Up! (Nathan's Economic Edge, takket være Leanan)

Riktignok et par uker gammel, men budskapet er ganske klart.

Deflasjon, pågående, til tross for nullrente og helikopterpenger.

Nathan sier den er akselererende; det klarer ikke jeg å se ut av grafene hans.

Men jeg kan ikke helt se hvordan deflasjonen kan stoppes heller...

La la la

OK ble litt hysterisk i siste innlegg; kjenner at jeg ikke er helt komfortabel med det. Men det får stå, litt av poenget med dette blogge-opplegget er jo nettopp å ta vare på hva jeg mente, trodde, følte... og å øve meg opp til være litt mer spontan...

De epost-postede postene ser forøvrig helt gjørme ut, men det får også stå. Dokumentasjon.

"En perfekt storm"

Jeg vet nesten ikke om jeg skal le eller gråte.

 

Averting a perfect storm of shortages (BBC News)

 

<blockquote>

As the world's population grows, competition for food, water and energy will increase. Food prices will rise, more people will go hungry, and migrants will flee the worst-affected regions.

That's the simple idea at the heart of the warning from John Beddington, the UK government's chief scientific adviser, of a possible crisis in 2030.

Specifically, he points to research indicating that by 2030 "a whole series of events come together":

• The world's population will rise from 6bn to 8bn (33%)
• Demand for food will increase by 50%
• Demand for water will increase by 30%
• Demand for energy will increase by 50%

He foresees each problem combining to create a "perfect storm" in which the whole is bigger, and more serious, than the sum of its parts.

</blockquote>

 

"A POSSIBLE CRISIS IN 2030"???!

Har han fått med seg at vi har et ørlite problem med fallende oljeutvinning på verdensbasis?

At dette problemet ikke synes spesielt tydelig akkurat nå, fordi vi er inne i et finansielt ragnarok, en "resesjon" som verden ikke har sett maken til?

At denne "finanskrisen" gjør at investeringer både i tradisjonelle og "alternative" energiformer tørker ut?

De tre nevnte punktene alene betyr at krisepunktet er mye nærmere enn 2030, uten å ta hensyn til veksten i befolkning og relaterte herligheter. 

Så har vi i tillegg den ustoppelige befolkningsveksten.

Og klimaendringer som allerede nå gir tørke over store deler av verden.

Og vannreservoarer og elver verden over som går tomme for vann.

Og kostnaden for å utvinne essensielle mineraler må forventes å stige betraktelig på middels til lang sikt...

HALLO! VÅKN OPP! KRISEN ER NÅ!

 

 

Kina begrenser eksport av REM

I følge MarketWatch:

 

Metal-Pages reported on August 19, 2009 [...] that the Chinese Government restricted the annual export of Rare Earths to 35,000 tpy and prohibited exports of Heavy Rare Earths such as Dysprosium (Dy), Terbium (Te), Thulium (Tm), Lutetium (Lu) and Yttrium (Y).

(MWs link til Metal-Pages er feil, den riktige er Chinese restrictions on rare earths may speed up development of North American exploration projects)

 

Edderkoppsansen min sier meg at dette er viktig, men jeg ser ikke de fulle konsekvensene... Er dette et tegn på kinesisk styrke, eller er det et tegn på kinesisk desperasjon? Katastrofe for vestlig high-tech - industri, eller nådegave til vestlig gruveindustri?

En fartsdump

World faces hi-tech crunch as China eyes ban on rare metal exports (Ambrose Evans-Pritchard / Telegraph)

 

Dette er en problemstilling som har vært livlig diskutert på TOD; de såkalte "rare earth" - mineralene er sjeldne, svært viktige i produksjon av det meste av high-tech - produkter, og produseres stort sett i Kina. Dette er en alvorlig flaskehals for storskala utbygging av "alternativ" energi.

 

Dersom Kina innfører eksportforbud, så har vi et problem.

 

 

 

 

Hvor ille er det egentlig?

Verdens matvaresituasjon, altså. Jeg synes ikke det ser pent ut, men det er vanskelig å få noe godt oversiktsbilde. Noen artikler fra de siste dagene:

 

India to import food amid drought (BBC News)

 

India will import food to make up for shortages caused by a drought thought to be affecting 700 million people, the finance minister has said. [...]

The farm minister, Sharad Pawar, said the government would take action to ensure prices remained stable.

He added: "[The] situation is grim, not just for the crop sowing and the crop health but also for sustaining animal health, providing drinking water, livelihood and food, particularly for the small and marginal farmers and landless labourers."

The farm minister, Sharad Pawar, said the government would take action to ensure prices remained stable.

He added: "[The] situation is grim, not just for the crop sowing and the crop health but also for sustaining animal health, providing drinking water, livelihood and food, particularly for the small and marginal farmers and landless labourers."

700 mill er en tidel av verdens befolkning; ikke småtterier.

 

 

Extended drought threatens China farmland (cctv)

 

The extended drought in China's north and northeast regions now threatens over 8 million hectares of farmland.

 

 

Driving new changes in Asian irrigation (OneWorld South Asia)

 

Asian agriculture registered dramatic advances during the 1960s and 1970s through a combination of irrigation, improved crop varieties and fertilisers.

The resulting Green Revolution made it possible to avert widespread hunger and raise living standards. From 1970 to 1995, the area under irrigation in Asia more than doubled.

Today, the option of expanding irrigated land area in Asia to feed a growing population is becoming increasingly problematic due to land or water constraints.

 

Og utsiktene til at det skal bli bedre fremover er dårlige:

 

'No development will be of use if Ganga dries up'

 

 

Personlighet II

OK jeg har gravd litt mer navlelo... tatt et par personlighetstester på nettet... nedenstående bilde er representativt for resultatene:



Pen presentasjon av resultatene på MyPersonality.info, men de krever registrering, og formuleringen av spørsmålene var ikke den beste. Uregistrert og langt den best formulerte nett-testen jeg har tatt så langt hos HumanMetrics, sidene er ser litt gamle ut men det bryr ikke meg 8-)

Noen penetrerende innsikter fra tilfeldige steder:

INTPs are relatively easy-going and amenable to almost anything until their principles are violated, about which they may become outspoken and inflexible. They prefer to return, however, to a reserved albeit benign ambiance, not wishing to make spectacles of themselves.

A major concern for INTPs is the haunting sense of impending failure. They spend considerable time second-guessing themselves. The open-endedness (from Perceiving) conjoined with the need for competence (NT) is expressed in a sense that one's conclusion may well be met by an equally plausible alternative solution, and that, after all, one may very well have overlooked some critical bit of data. An INTP arguing a point may very well be trying to convince himself as much as his opposition.

(typelogic)(min uthevelse)

Denne her er den beste kortversjonen:

loner, more interested in intellectual pursuits than relationships or family, wrestles with the meaninglessness of existence, likes esoteric things, disorganized, messy, likes science fiction, can be lonely, observer, private, can't describe feelings easily, detached, likes solitude, not revealing, unemotional, rule breaker, avoidant, familiar with the darkside, skeptical, acts without consulting others, does not think they are weird but others do, socially uncomfortable, abrupt, fantasy prone, does not like happy people, appreciates strangeness, frequently loses things, acts without planning, guarded, not punctual, more likely to support marijuana legalization, not prone to compromise, hard to persuade, relies on mind more than on others, calm

(similarminds.com)

Utrolig... Dette er hele listen med stikkord fra similarminds, og hvert eneste ett er spot on. En tilfeldig assosiasjon... "does not like happy people"... jeg liker ikke at folk er lei seg, men når Jokke synger (sang? Jokke er død, men lever på CD; leve Jokke?)

Er du av typen som har store problemer
med å omgås overdrevet possitive folk

så svarer jeg et rungende JAA!

Men den beste er kanskje "An INTP Profile" av Paul James. Essayet er ganske langt, mye lengre enn sitatet, som er langt nok... Uthevelsene er mine (unntatt når jeg sier noe annet):

The drive to understand things that are not yet understood is a very powerful force in the life of an INTP. Where the Ti preference is strong, this drive can override the experiential element so strongly that the INTP will become quickly bored with anything that he has successfully analysed to the point of understanding it. Once understood, it has nothing left to offer, once the satisfaction which comes with achieving the goal of understanding diminishes. Indeed, most primary interests of an INTP are things which he cannot fully understand, usually because they are highly complex or have some exotic, mystical element that does not yield to analysis. This is the real reason why INTPs are drawn to complexity: anything simple is too quickly understood and cannot hold the fascination for long.

Kjenner meg igjen i det, ja...

Similarly, proficiency in any area (which requires continual practice after understanding) is not such a driving force as it might be for NTJs, for example. While a judging NT will often seek to become master of his field, an INTP is satisfied by analysing it alone. The latter is often more of dabbler with ideas which leads me on to his second crucial aspect: detachment.

The Ti-Ne axis leads to a curious overriding desire to observe from a detached position, indicating the preference for intuitive perception with respect to external things. Since accurate analysis needs to avoid becoming hampered with details or being influenced by the actions of others, the INTP invariably seeks to withdraw, at least in spirit, from the situation being considered. This detachment can sometimes be so marked that he will readily see himself as a neutral observer having no personal association with that going on around him (unless forced to become directly involved through an attack on his principles). The INTP enjoys speculating about how a news item (for example) might be received by other people or how a point of view might offend certain types of people and be supported by yet other types; but to have a point of view of his own rarely seems relevant! This also indicates that Feeling is his least developed function. The argument may even be made that "points of view" and "opinions" are irrelevant since only objective truth counts. In reality, INTPs can often become far less objective than they think they ought to be: precisely at those times when the under-developed Feeling gnaws at his being.

Dominant Function: Introverted Thinking

Now looking specifically at first the Ti, the principle of detachment even encompasses how an INTP views himself. He may analyse his own thought processes as if his mind and body were separate from his conscious self. In wanting to understand his reactions to things, he may treat himself, even his own thoughts, as subjects for experiment. At the extreme end of the scale, where Ti is very dominant, the ultimate goal of understanding the world with total clarity must be achieved through total detachment from everything. Fortunately, Ti never dominates over the other 3 preferences to such an extent that such an unhealthy state is reached.

Where detachment ceases is when someone makes an illogical statement or violates one of the INTPs principles. At such a point, the INTP feels the instant drive to provide for clarity. This is his Mission; to be the provider of clarity, and is often suspicious that he is the only person capable of this task. Here, the INTP risks being seen as over-critical, aloof and arrogant. On the whole, however, real arrogance is rare for INTPs for their desire is not to dominate others but simply to observe, analyse and clarify. Once the point has been clarified, the INTP withdraws quickly, for he prefers not to be in the limelight unless absolutely necessary. Hence, for most of the time, INTPs are easy-going and will fit in to others' needs, taking up the role of observer again.

Det er det nærmeste jeg kommer noe livsmotto, det: This is my Mission; to be the Provider of Clarity!

While proficiency may not be a central goal, competence always is. The difference here may be subtle, but it is important. If an INTP decides to learn a skill, then it is very important for him that he reaches a sufficient level so that basic errors can be avoided. Errors made by others are to be expected and can be criticised. But errors made by oneself attack the very root of the person, which is ultimately about rationality, logic and truth. INTPs hate to think of themselves being in any way inadequate, at least in areas that are important to them. So, as soon as he puts himself behind some task, then he must achieve competency. But that is as far as it goes. Refined competency requires too much effort and has little attraction. It would require practice and that usually bores an INTP. Hence, it is common to see INTPs dabbling at many things, achieving competency, just enough to prove to themselves that they could become more proficient if they wished, but rarely actually bothering to refine their skills further. This is a point at which we begin to get a feel for the workings of iNtuition backing up Thinking. The INTP has a whole set of skills which he knows that he would be proficient at, yet other people may know little of this. He is satisfied with the knowledge that he has these skills but often sees no requirement to demonstrate this to others, an indication of the strong Ti nature.

Sterk gjenkjennelse her også... kompetent i alt det faller meg inn å prøve på; gir meg ikke før jeg får det til... og når jeg har kommet så langt, har det liten videre interesse. Over på neste prosjekt! Eksempel: Har brukt et par år på å lære meg å svømme crawl skikkelig... et par økter i uka. Kom etterhvert opp på et nivå som må kalles "kompetent"... og nå? Nå har jeg kjøpt kajakk.

Finally, the dominant Ti function means that the INTP takes his interests and beliefs very seriously. Honesty and directness when explaining these interests are usually displayed. INTPs detest facades and particulary dislike people who exhibit them. Equally, those kind of people also dislike INTPs and avoid them at all cost, for they know that the INTP will see right through them.

(uthevelse i originalen)

Vel... jeg tar alt og ingenting alvorlig. Livet er en lek; men en lek er morsomst når du tar den alvorlig...

Where the extraversion of the iNtuition function becomes obvious is during discussions, especially heated ones. In contrast to INTJs, an INTP will often make controversial, speculative points of argument, often annoying the discussion-partner, and make them in such a way as to leave the impression that he is very serious about what he says. In reality, the INTP is not actually even certain himself whether he really stands by what he is saying, but his Ne strongly suggests that there must be a core of truth there. The purpose then of his outspoken style of argument is to sharpen his own intuitive understanding by testing the reaction of the listener, and indeed to examine the logic of his own arguments in real time while speaking them out. On occasion, INTPs may seem brash and tactless, but for themselves it is part of their way of getting closer to the truth.

"Will often make controversial, speculative points of argument". Oh yes, you bet.

"Often annoying the discussion-partner". Jada. Been there, done that.

Humour is another aspect which marks out the INTP. He can readily dream up jokes about almost any situation. Taking things out of context is the chief source of humour and many an INTP is a Monty Pythonite. The Ne is the engine and source of this joke-generator. Needless to say, the humour of an INTP can be pretty zany and warped and may not be understood easily by others. The problem is that the Ne concepts for jokes are put into a structure only by the Ti. Hence, the humour can become black and tactless, having felt little Feeling input. Funnily enough, INTPs are dreadful tellers of jokes (which seems to be more the domain of those with Se), perhaps because they pay too little attention to detail when speaking spontaneously. If you see someone smirking and laughing at some private thought, without any obvious reason, he's probably an INTP. INTPs may however make good comedy writers, with the humour of Woody Allen being particularly liked.

Definitivt en Monty Pythonitt, ja. Og det skjer stadig vekk at jeg sitter på bussen, går på gata eller står på butikken og smiler og ler. Helt for meg selv. Ta det med ro, mannen er ikke gal, bare INTP.

The feeling shadow is the fear centre of the INTP. He rarely fears any factual thing in the outside world, at least not things that will be encountered in normal day-to-day living. Logic stipulates that external objects or people which threaten can always potentially be dealt with by instigating an active defence strategy. Of course, the possibility of being left truly helpless leaves the INTP cold, for once the Ti core is defeated, the inferior Fe can offer little comfort. Resigned acceptance of the unacceptable is an anathema for INTPs. His typical response to helplessness is to hate the world which has produced it. However, the greatest fears of an INTP are usually ideas generated within his own mind. The problem is that the Ti-Ne axis is capable of conceiving very unpleasant ideas, which may be far from reality and even irrational. Ideas and possibilities assume so much importance in the mind of an INTP that they can override a common sense factual grasp on reality. Since the emotional response to an unpleasant idea is based on an underdeveloped function, it may also fail to bring a return to common sense.

Capable of conceiving very unpleasant ideas... som sivilisasjonskollaps pga finasiellt ragnarok, Peak Oil, klimakatastrofe e.l. ...?

Can override a common sense factual grasp on reality... Jepp, jeg ser muligheten for det, ja. Noe å tenke på... Men da er vi tilbake (nesten) ved start:

A major concern for INTPs is the haunting sense of impending failure. They spend considerable time second-guessing themselves. The open-endedness (from Perceiving) conjoined with the need for competence (NT) is expressed in a sense that one's conclusion may well be met by an equally plausible alternative solution, and that, after all, one may very well have overlooked some critical bit of data.

Optimister...!

Gambler med sparepengene (DN)

Lavere renter, og lysere utsikter for verdensøkonomien får norske fondssparere til å forlate nødhavnene.

- Trenden vi har sett blant norske fondssparere i hele år forsterkes i juli. Private fondssparere fortsetter å kjøpe aksjefond og søker stadig vekk mer risiko og potensial i sparingen sin. Kina har i løpet av juli seilt opp som fondssparernes favorittregion, sier Anders Skar daglig leder i Nordnet Norge.

Skar tror dette skyldes at sparerne har tiltro til de positive signalene rundt landets økonomi

Ugggh. Hvis du er sparer, og skal gjøre noe med aksjer eller aksjefond nå, så er det å selge. Utviklingen i USA er ikke holdbar, og det er tvilsomt at den i Kina er det.

Noen linker:

China’s growth figures fail to add up (FT)

Goldman: Please Keep Trading The China Bubble (GS) (Business Insider)

Fresh Signs of China's Asset Bubble (Seeking Alpha)


Five Reasons the Market Could Crash This Fall (Seeking Alpha)

Second U.S. Bank-for-Businesses Faces Bankruptcy (Seeking Alpha)

Why Another Stock Market Collapse Could Be Imminent (Seeking Alpha)

(takk til TAE og thethirdcoast)

Fra den siste:

A lot of commentators have begun heralding a new bull market in stocks. Day after day, I hear that March was THE bottom, that the next bull market has begun, and that anyone betting on another collapse is a moron.

These claims are not only wrong, they are completely misleading and should be depicted for what they are: nonsensical hype from sources with conflicted interests - folks whose jobs and income stem largely from people remaining bullish.

Bare overskriftene bør få folk til å stoppe og tenke. Ærlig talt, hva er det de tror? "Det er ikke mulig å tjene penger på å ha dem i banken lenger og heller ikke i sikrere typer fond så jeg flytter dem til kinafond. Ikke det at jeg vet noe om Kina, men de har visst en helt eventyrlig vekst der borte! Og de folkene som forvalter fondet er jo profesjonelle."

Hva lærte vi om profesjonelle pengeforvaltere i fjor, dere?

Hva lærte 2008 oss om forholdet mellom risiko og avkastning?

Tror dere helt seriøst at bunnen er bak oss og at vi har en femten års opptur foran oss?

Sett penga i banken for faen! Jeg har ikke lyst til å bo i et land hvor 97% av husstandene har fem mill i lån på en bolig som faller i verdi til en fjerdedel, og hvor alle de samme husstandene har plassert pengereservene sine i fond som gikk til null i Det Store Krakket i 2009.

And don't get me started on the Oljefondet

Kompleksitet og sårbarhet

Mer interessant på TOD: Things fall apart: Complexity, Supply Chains, Infrastructure & Collapse

Interessant, men kunne for min del gått litt dypere inn i materien... whatever, det gjøres i kommentarene. Memmel is on a roll:

Ingeniører og Murphys lov:

It turns out that the complex systems least likely to fail are those still managed by gloom and doomers and least dependent on a high maintenance grid. [...] In fact I'd argue only doomers can successfully build complex reliable robust systems. Anti-doomers will always eventually face catastrophic failure because they refuse to focus on it yet failure modes esp the catastrophic ones are the defining signature of complex systems.

Hva som går og hva som blir:

Now they may become expensive and its highly probably if we continue to require diesel engines that the designs will be adjusted to allow less complex manufacturing processes. The original diesels where built in home workshops.

[...]

Road networks fail, Electrical networks fail, city societies fail but as long as knowledge exists and the equipment can be put together the ability to make stuff lasts for a very long time. Far more likely is diesel engines will eventually be abandoned in favor of easier to make and run steam engines. Not that we won't continue to make them but external combustion engines have a lot of advantages over internal combustion engines if society relocalizes.

Memmel kommenterer også på IEA Economist Warns about World Oil Supply:

In fact one of the reasons I expect oil prices to go much higher then most people believe possible is simply because the system despite its flaws is resilient to a rapid collapse.
Highly inflated property values actually play a big role in this in a sort of paradox.

Property values can fall substantially freeing up cash flow for daily living and purchasing oil at ever higher prices for some time before we actually reach the point that the system is structurally collapsing. The same problem that prevents me from readily doing what I'd like to do post peak also works to ensure that collapse will be slowed down at first.
As a renter I've already taken advantage of this securing a much lower rent for a nicer place using just the current fall in housing prices. In my opinion there is plenty of room for prices to continue to fall.

Han estimerer at dette kan pågå i en to-tre, kanskje så mye som fem år. Først da er vi ved punktet hvor ytterligere prisstigning vil kunne gi kollaps... (argh, finner ikke den referansen. Jeg må bli flinkere til å poste linker & utdrag her)

Dette er vel langt på vei forklaringen på holdningen til The Automatic Earth (som er svært PO-bevisste) - Ilargi på TAE 4.de aug:

Look, I still appreciate a few people at TOD, got together with Nate not so long ago, but the oil-centred thing is just not where's it's at right now. Oil won’t drive financial events. They drive themselves at the moment and will continue to do so through the years to come. No matter what the price of oil may be, no matter how much money governments spend to cover up losses already incurred, the dice have left the hand and are rolling cross the table. Rien ne va plus.

Stoneleigh in her "40 ways" says oil wil become unaffordable within 5 years, and that may well be too long a timeframe. What we're trying to say here is that soon it won't make any difference if oil is $4, $400 or 40 cents per gallon, because people won't have either sort of discretionary cash, except perhaps for emergencies. And when I say that oil will return as a major story, but in a different sense, in 10-20 years, maybe that is too long as well.

Oil will become a story not of convenience or riding on the highway or freedom or world travel or even simply running machinery, it will become the number one story of power. Modern armies run on oil, and who gets caught without it will be largely defenseless. I say largely because of the joker in the deck that is asymmetrical warfare. And somewhere in there is an as yet undefined role for nuclear weapons, which may rewrite the whole script in a matter of minutes or hours.

For now, though, going into this fall and 2010-11, the one tale that matters far more than anything else for "ordinary people" is that of unwinding and disappearing credit and accumulated debt. The cost of oil is but a bit player on that stage.

USA i trøbbel

Ikke noe nytt, dette; tenkte bare jeg skulle oppsummere mine tanker og observasjoner det siste halve året+, som fikk meg til å utbasunere forrige dagen at "USA er fucked".

De blir troffet (jæi bohr rikti nåkk i Asker kåmmuhne, menn jæi sier ikke "truffet") av tre kriser samtidig.

1) En økonomisk krise

2) En politisk krise

3) En energikrise

Til en viss grad er det bare tre aspekter av samme krise, men vi må dele opp og forenkle litt for å få oversikt... (minimalt med linker/referanser åsså, må priotitere flyt)

I rekkefølge:

I følge MSM går alt så meget bedre nu, der over dammen.

Don't believe the hype. Den amerikanske forbrukeren - som i bobletiden de siste tiårene utgjorde to tredeler eller mer av USAs BNP - er forgjeldet til langt opp over ørene. Dette har mye å gjøre med boligboblen som sprakk; mange som hadde lån på hus skaffet seg nye takster etthvert som boblen ble større, og tok ut "gevinsten" i cash isf å redusere gjeldsgraden.

Boligmarkedet sprakk, og med det forsvant ikke bare en hel horde med jobber i byggebransjen, men viktigere, folk flest fikk mindre penger å rutte med. Til en viss grad sprakk det fordi folk fikk mindre penger å rutte med; høyere renter, høyere energipriser. Til en viss grad sprakk det fordi alle bobler en gang må sprekke.

Hva må til for å få den amerikanske forbrukeren tilbake dit han (beklager jenter, jeg vet dere liker å shoppe, men gutta bruker mest penger -- de kjøper SUVer, schvære stereoanlegg, båter og andre penisforlengere; det går MANGE par sko på en SUV) var pre-2008?

Mindre gjeld. Og det skjer, MEN på bekostning av forbruket... de som har lønn (fremdeles mange) og gjeld (de fleste) må nå betale ned gjeld. I overskuelig framtid. Denninger (tror jeg det var) kommenterte kredittkortgjeld for noen dager siden... den toppet seg i januar 2009. Dvs gjeldssaneringsprosessen er bare i startfasen...

Så en eventuell "ny vekst" i verdensøkonomien kommer ikke til å komme fra amerikanske forbrukere.

Da er alternativet den amerikanske staten.

Den tar opp mye gjeld, men det er veldig lite som går til å stimulere økonomien -- det aller, aller meste av pengene går til å holde liv i finansinstitusjoner som blør ut av alle kroppsåpninger. Og de bruker pengene, ikke til utlån, men bare sitter på dem, som sikkerhet mot tap de vet kommer. Dvs de sitter ikke på dem; de parkerer dem i statsobligasjoner... O hvilken ironi...

Den andre krisen, den politiske, kan kanskje best oppsummeres med Galbraiths navn "Predator State". De institusjonene som hans far var med på å utvikle, og som hadde en stor del av æren for å få USA ut av depresjonen, og senere gjøre det til verdens definitive industrielle og økonomiske stormakt... er blitt undergravet av private interesser, som har omformet det tidligere gjensidig fruktbare samspillet mellom stat og næringsliv til et enveis samlebånd, hvor pengene går rett i lomma på noen få store spillere... Tragedien er at disse få store spillerne har så mye innflytelse i statsapparatet, at det er vanskelig å se at trenden kan snus. (Denne "innflytelsen" er til dels direkte korrupsjon, men det er også i stor grad politikere som er ofre for sin egen ideologi - det frie markedet overalt-alltid, halleluja! Og heltedyrkelse: Wall Street - the best and brightest)!

(Amerikansk økonomisk-adminstrativ historie er forøvrig veldig interessant, og har langt større karakter av planøkonomi enn det frie markedets ideologer vil ha det til. Interesserte bør kikke på verkene til Galbraith sr og jr, og vår egen Erik Reinert ("The Other Canon" er hans navn på ortodoks økonomisk teori fra Galbraith, sr.'s tid))

Den tredje krisen er energikrisen. USA er verdens mest oljeavhengige nasjon; de er verdens tredje største oljeprodusent, men importerer likevel to tredeler av sitt oljeforbruk. De er så å si fullstendig uforberedt på Peak Oil: veisystemet deres smuldrer opp; elektrisitetsnettet er foreldet og knapt tilstrekkelig til dagens bruk, langt mindre til utstrakt elektrifisering av transport; jernbanenettet deres er fullstendig utilstrekkelig; folk bor i suburbs milevidt fra arbeidsstedet og må kjøre bil til jobb... USA som nasjon er avhengig av rikelig, billig olje for å henge sammen. Tiltakene Hirsch-rapporten trekker fram som de nødvendige, utstrakt utbygging av Heavy Oil, Coal-to-Liquids og Gas-to-Liquids er knapt påbegynt...

Og her er det krisene møtes.

En skikkelig leder, i spissen for et politisk/administrativt apparat med ekte makt, hadde kunnet benytte krisestemningen rundt presidentskiftet i januar til å mobilisere landet. Fortelle amerikanerne at de står i kloakk til over overleppa med noe tongt rundt beina, at dersom fullstendig kollaps skal unngås så må vi mobilisere landet som før andre verdenskrig, og sette i gang: oppgradere strømnettet, bygge jernbane, konvertere tongtransporten til å kjøre på gass, sette igang byfortettingsprogrammer, bileffektiviseringstiltak som monner, beordre den totalt skakkjørte bilindustrien til å delvis bygge tog og delvis effektive biler... gi dem statsstøtte i overgangsperioden. Og storskala CtL og GtL... svært lite ønskelig fra miljøstandpunkt, men sannsynligvis nødvendig for å unngå kræsj.

Men Obama var ingen Churchill... og sannsynligvis var også administrasjonsapparatet han hadde å jobbe med ikke i stand til å implementere en sånn snuoperasjon. Amerikanerne fortsetter i gamle spor, og førsøker å gjenopprette "normalitet", å komme tilbake til vekst.

Et annet aspekt ved den manglende snuoperasjonen er dette: Det er sannsynlig at eliten - de grå eminensene med de store pengene - ser at enden er nær, og benytter anledningen til å tømme skattkammeret før skuta synker. I Axelrods terminologi: The shadow of the future is short...

Alt dette mer eller mindre garanterer at US of A er på vei mot en... diskontinuitet.

En god idé

India pays off couples to put off having children (Guardian)

The country's population stands at 1.2 billion and is expected to reach 1.53 billion by 2050. But increasing pressure on resources means that there is barely enough water and food to go round.

A pilot project in the Satara district of Maharashtra has proved a success and other states, including Delhi and Assam, are now considering cash incentives.

Satara, funded by the National Rural Health Mission, is offering couples a reward of 5,000 rupees (£62) if they delay having a child for two years (70 rupees a day is a good wage in rural areas). If they wait another year, they receive a further 2,500 rupees.

The birthrate in the district rose from 16.5 births a thousand people in 2005 to 17 in 2007. The project initially attracted 977 couples, but that figure has risen to 2,366.

Satara has about 25,000 marriages a year and 80% result in the birth of a child within the first year. Only 155 couples on the programme left to have children.

Kontantstøtte i revers!

Apropos Kina:

- Kina vil dra oss ut av krisen (e24)

 

Den legendariske investoren Marc Faber gikk denne helgen hardt ut og anklaget kinesiske myndigheter for å jukse med veksttallene for landets brutto nasjonalprodukt (BNP).

Kina meldte for to uker siden om en BNP-vekst på 7,9 prosent fra andre kvartal i fjor til samme periode i år

Norske økonomer som E24 har snakket med, deler ikke Fabers syn.

- Det har Faber ingen dekning for å si, sier sjeføkonom Knut Anton Mork i Handelsbanken Markets til E24.

Professor i samfunnsøkonomi Arne Jon Isachsen er enig med Mork.

- Det vil alltid finnes feilkilder, men jeg tror i hvert fall ikke det er en bevisst politikk, sier Isachsen til E24.

- Tilliten til de kinesiske tallene er økende, sier Isachsen.

Eeeh. I lys av gårsdagens post ville jeg i allefall si at de kinesiske tallene er nokså tvilsomme? Det hadde vært veldig, veldig fint om de to ga litt positiv begrunnelse for tilliten sin... hvordan de har funnet ut at "tilliten er økende", for eksempel... hørt det i kantina? "Basert på uformelle studier av stemningen i kantinen fremstår tilliten til de kinesiske tallene som økende".

 

IKKE tillitvekkende

OPPDATERING: Andy Xie: China Has Become A Giant Ponzi Scheme (Ritholz)

Galbraith: Kina kan ha hatt handelsunderskudd

via Zero Hedge:

University of Texas professor James Galbraith discusses one aspect of China's "booming" economy, specifically the question of China's Trade Surplus, which as he notes has been drastically inflated since 2002 due to Chinese companies over-reporting profits on exports in order to disguise various investments by foreigners into China, so as to beat capital control restrictions.

Galbraith argues the "fake profits" are so large that China may have actually ran a trade deficit in some years, and these figures casts serious doubt on the reported P&L of Chinese companies.

Dette er veldig interessant; Kina er et eksempel mange som gjerne vil hevde at ikke alt er bæsj i verdensøkonomien trekker fram. Og Galbraith har førstehåndskjennskap til Kina... jeg bare må sitere fra hans diskusjon om Kina i The Predator State:

[R]eal wages in the exporting regions -- wages measured in terms of the consumption goods they provide for -- are not low at all by the larger standards of working populations in the developing world. [...] Working people in Chinese cities are largely fit, literate, and well fed [...]

How do the Chinese achieve this? Not by planning, and not by avoiding the competitive pressures of the free market in consumer goods. Quite to the contrary: China enjoys the largest number of small producers and the most diverse and competitive consumer marketplace on the planet. Correspondingly, many of these firms performs as the competitive model predicts: they earn profits rarely, losses often.

How then do firms survive? Why does China prosper? How can it continue to grow at reported rates near 10 percent, through the Japanese depression, the Russian crisis, the Internet bust? The answer is, once again, not to be found in the trading agreements so much as in the structure of financial control. For in this area, China benefits form its underdevelopment.

A key and unique feature of the Chinese scene is the relative absence of a developed market for capital assets. Such markets -- for stocks and corporate control -- do exist; indeed the Shanghai stock market went on an epic run in the mid-2000s. [fotnote: The fuel behind the Chinese stock and real estate booms remains open to analysis. One possibility is that after certain financial liberalizations in 2002, firms inflated the value of Chinese exports in order to evade capital controls and bring funds into the country. If true, this would explain several otherwise strange phenomena, including mysteriously high reported profits reported by some major Chinese firms and the astonishing rises in the reported trade surplus and fixed investment as a share of Chinese GDP.] But the capital markets have limited scope, limited liquidity, and limited power. Most firms are not publicly valued and not easily traded; in this important sense, "property rights" in the firm are limited. Diverse ownership form and relatively small scale are especially characteristic of the vast array of consumer goods producers that now dominate manufacturing in southern China. Though formerly owned by villages and townships in many cases, they have been recently privatized -- sold off to managers or worker's collectives -- not because they are profitable but because they are not. Selling them off removes their direct claim on the local budget.

In these circumstances, capital markets do not excercise discipline over the medium-term financial performance of manufacturing firms. Firms can run losses, and their shares do not collapse, and their managements are not replaced. When they run profits (with difficulty, but it does happen) their managements are not enriched per se; there is graft and there is speculation, but there is relatively little possibility, for most excecutives, of selling out and retiring on the proceeds. To make money in this situation requires preserving the enterprise as a going concern. And that means passing whatever financial scrutiny would otherwise cause the firm to lose credit and to be shut down. In China, this scrutiny is extremely weak.

[...] This competition results in a chronic glut in consumer markets. This is evident in the fact that sidewalks across China are covered with stalls. Price competition is phenomenal, as any casual visitor can find out: with minimal effort, prices will fall to a tenth or less of the original offer. There is little possibility that such prices cover the fixed costs of those who produce the goods on offer.

Is there any way for the Chinese manufacturing firm to turn a profit? Yes: the alternative to selling on the domestic market is to export. [...] [T]he optimal strategy for earning a profit is to aim, atleast in some ultimate sense, for export. It is to produce and produce, gaining practice, improving quality, and demonstrating reliability -- in the hope of eventually selling part of production on the export market -- perhaps first to some low-income venue such as India, later to middle-income countries such as Turkey or Mexico, and ultimately to the United States and Europe. For this, labor must be treated as fixed cost. That is, production must continue regardless of demand. The strategy will be defeated, from the beginning, if firms must interrupt production and dismiss workers simply because the output they are producing cannot be sold immediately at the Wal-Mart price.

So what to do with the output that cannot be exported? The answer is already stated. That output is dumped on the domestic market at whatever price it may command. The imperative to the small shopkeeper inside China is not to earn a profit; it is to unload product, because more will be coming from the factory soon. And the result is falling prices (deflation) for Chinese consumers. Relative to a fixed money wage, this implies a rising real wage in terms of staples. The result -- well-fed, well-clothed citizens and a near absence of visible human depravity in the cities -- is visually evident to any observer.

[...]

China reproduces, more closely than capitalist countries do, both the theoretical dynamics and the public welfare implications of the perfectly competitive market. It does so precisely because it lacks the essential feature of advanced capitalism, a fully developed market for capital assets. Such markets are under development -- if China truly lives up to commitments made under its World Trade Organization agreements to liberalize its financial sector -- and one may confidently predict that if it becomes fully developed, the Chinese model will go into crisis, and progress will stop -- as it did in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere in Asia. But for the moment, the Chinese appear to have that impulse to self-destruction under control. (s 82 ff)

Jeg har utelatt Galbraiths kommentarer om bankenes rolle i systemet... Skrev av manuelt fra boken, for lat til å ta med mer...